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The present work reviews the relation between culture and eco-
nomics; in doing so, we often distinguish between the historical com-
ponent of culture (i.e. inherited values) and its contemporaneous
component (i.e. social interactions). First, the paper emphasizes
which cultural traits are relevant in economics, reviews situations
where culture affects economic outcomes and addresses the relevance
of culture across time and space. Then, it explains the theoretical
framework of reference for the transmission of both contemporane-
ous and inherited culture. Finally, it presents econometric techniques
available to the researchers and suitable to investigate the impact of
culture on economic outcomes, providing suggestions for future re-
search.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work that emphasizes the importance of cultural eco-
nomics by Banfield (1958), other work has been emerging, but a vivid in-
terest in the importance of culture came later, only in the last years.
Although definitions of culture are multiple and it is difficult to provide
a single and exhaustive definition of the concept, in order to make clear
to the reader the object of the analysis we can say that “economic culture
is defined as the beliefs, attitudes, and values that bear on the economic
activities of individuals, organizations and other institutions” (Porter, in
Harrison and Huntington, 2000, : 14). Indeed, culture is the result of dif-
ferent beliefs, such as religious creeds, social beliefs and norms, habits, and
values transmitted over generations that, through social interactions and in-
tergenerational transmission, influence individual decisions and policies of
countries and regions. Nowadays, it is recognized that cultural traits repre-
sent important determinants for the study of both individual decisions and
macroeconomics.
The present work is aimed at reviewing the literature on cultural eco-
nomics and the ways it can influence economic outcomes. The aim of this
survey is twofold. On the one hand, in the first part of the analysis we
define various life situations where culture matters for both individual and
macroeconomic decisions. On the other hand, we first present an overview of
quantitative methods that can be used when assessing the impact of culture
on economics, their limits and properties; we point out which econometric
tools are more suitable when analyzing the interrelation between culture
and economics and provide suggestions for future research.
The paper is innovative because it first reviews theory and econometrics
of culture distinguishing between contemporaneous (i.e. social interactions)
and historical (i.e. transmission of values) component of culture (Bisin and
Verdier, 2001; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Tabellini, 2008a, 2010). Besides,
it provides methodological suggestions for future research to investigate the
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relation between culture and economics. Finally, it is one of the few papers
that presents a comprehensive and exhaustive analysis of the role of culture
in economics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews situations
where culture influences either individual decisions or macroeconomic out-
comes. Section 3 presents the theory of both contemporaneous culture and
intergenerational transmission of values. Section 4 defines the economet-
rics of models of social interactions and cultural transmission and provides
suggestions about the methodology to use in cultural economics. The last
section concludes.
2 Culture and Economics
Culture is the byproduct of complex, plural and interrelated processes. This
explains why culture is a basin of attraction not only for economists, but also
for other scientists such as anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists.
Nevertheless, although culture is a broad concept and subject to dif-
ferent definitions by scientists (Greif, 1994; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;
Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006), nowadays the literature recognizes it is an im-
portant determinant when explaining economic outcomes. Indeed, despite
the presence of different views, some in favor of a causality relation from de-
velopment to culture (Marx, 1859; Inghleart, 1990, 1997), others supporting
the theory of a causality relationship from culture to economic development
(Banfield, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Tabellini, 2010), and
others (Dasgupta, 2003) stating that the relation between culture and eco-
nomics has to be interpreted as a correlation, recently the literature is more
willing to admit that different cultures may give rise to different economic
outcomes.
The impact of culture can be seen as the outcome of two main factors:
an historical component, made of habits and values received from parents
and earlier generations, and a contemporaneous component, represented by
3
beliefs generated by social interactions and networking. In the following
paragraphs we revise how and when culture influences economics.
2.1 Which Cultural traits?
After recognizing the importance of culture in economics, the recent litera-
ture is now oriented to understand which cultural traits are more important
to explain differences across both individuals and economies.
2.1.1 The “Trust Syndrome”
Trust is the cultural trait most widely used by economists to distinguish
between hierarchical societies, where trust is circumscribed to a small group
of people and opportunistic behavior is allowed towards the rest of a society
(i.e. personalized trust and amoral familism), and modern democratic so-
cieties, where trust is generalized towards a whole society (i.e. generalized
trust). Various researchers (Banfield, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993; Fukuyama,
1995; Marini, 2004; Tabellini, 2010) extensively explain the importance of
trust for economic efficiency. Indeed, it is well recognized by the literature
that the more a society is grounded on generalized trust the higher is the
level of efficiency of economic transactions across agents; while the higher
is the level of personalized trust the higher is the level of inefficiency of
economic transactions (e.g. Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005; Tabellini, 2010).
Also, some authors focus their attention on the importance of trust at the
microeconomic level (i.e. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Marini, 2016).
Yet, when the importance of social capital for an economy is of inter-
est, trust is not the only indicator to consider.1 Putnam et al. (1993) and
Helliwell and Putnam (1995) point out that regions in the North of Italy,
endowed of high civic culture, have a better provision of public goods and
1Although trust is widely used to proxy social capital here and along the cultural
economics literature, we would like to remark that trust cannot be used interchangeably
with social capital, rather trust has to be considered a component of it.
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experienced a higher rate of growth over the second half of the twentieth
century than the regions of Mezzogiorno (Southern regions), where trust
and civic culture are lower. Narayan and Pritchett (1999), using households
data in rural Tanzania, show that associational activity may be beneficial
to the economy by decreasing imperfect information and lowering transac-
tion and other costs; they demonstrate that social capital can be considered
a form of capital as much as other traditional forms of capital, which can
benefit the economy by increasing income. More recently, Beugelsdijk and
van Schaik (2005) empirically test the impact of social capital on economic
growth across European regions using indicators for trust and association; in
their work, using the European Values Study, they build indicators of both
passive and active association; their findings suggest that active association
is relevant to explain differences in rates of growth across European regions.
Finally, Crociata et al. (2015) first analyze the relationship between culture
and waste recycling. Their findings indicate that there exists a strong pos-
itive relation between cultural activity and the willingness to recycle and
that such sensibility to waste recycling is higher in Northern Italy than in
Southern Italy; thus, the results support the positive relationship between
social capital and civic behavior.
2.1.2 The “Achievement Motivation”
When analyzing the role played by culture in economics, it is important
to consider the impact not only of “collective social capital”, as generally
done by the literature, but also of “individual virtues” and the importance of
confidence in the individual in a society, especially in developed economies
(Fukuyama, 1995; Marini, 2004; Tabellini, 2010).
With respect to this, a literature parallel to that assessing the impact of
social capital on economic outcomes highlights the importance of individ-
ual virtues to motivate differences in individual productivity and economic
efficiency. McClelland (1961, 1975) considers the “need for achievement” as
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an individual virtue necessary for and positively correlated with economic
performance: It is in fact a quality that encourages people to do better and
to put effort in order to reach the set goal. Starting with Fukuyama (1995)
both the “trust syndrome” and “individual virtues” have been considered
crucial to explain economic efficiency. Since then researchers started to con-
sider a broader set of cultural traits to explain differences in both macroe-
conomic performance and individual behavior. Marini (2004), for instance,
reviews the literature and develops a model where both the “achievement
motivation” and the “trust syndrome” are taken into account as cultural
traits relevant to economic growth. In a later contribution (Marini, 2013)
he uses 25 factors taken from Harrison (2006) in order to assess which cul-
tural traits are progress-prone or progress-resistant: His results show that
both trust and individual virtues are important to explain differences in
economic performance. Some work (Beugelsdijk and Noorderhaven, 2004;
Beugelsdijk, 2007) considers the importance of entrepreneurial attitude for
economic growth.
Furthermore, the importance of objective individual freedom of choice
in economics has been remarked in some theories (e.g. Pattanaik and Xu,
1990; Sen, 1991), while other authors (e.g. Be´nabou and Tirole, 2000, 2006;
Bavetta and Navarra, 2012) have recently pointed out the relevance of sub-
jective individual freedom and its psychological implications to explain dif-
ferences in individual success and productivity: Such theories argue that
an autonomous person is more likely to think that effort and work rather
than luck may help to succeed and remark that a vision of the world where
individual effort pays off incentivizes higher individual productivity than a
vision of the world where success is perceived as due to luck. They also
emphasize that such differences in beliefs may lead to differences in policy
implementation (e.g. welfare and preferences for redistribution and policy-
making).
In sum, nowadays two sets of cultural values are considered relevant
to explain differences in economic performance by the current literature:
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“social capital” and individual virtues (Tabellini, 2010; Marini, 2013).
2.1.3 The Importance of Time and Geographic Dimension
Before proceeding further, it is important to remind that timing is also
important when analysing the impact of culture on economics. From an
historical perspective, some theories explain that culture matters in a later
stage of development. Foster (1973) points out that the limited good syn-
drome is predominant at an early stage of development and due to scarcity
of resources cooperation and trust are very low and limited in scope. As
also pointed out in Marini (2004), at this stage of development individuals
attitudes are rent seeking, restricted cooperation and fatalism, which hurt
economic development. Only at a later stage of development (i.e modernity)
culture plays a major role for economic performance. A non-monotonic rela-
tionship between culture and economic development has also been remarked
by Tabellini (2008b). Finally, it can be argued that because of the general
persistence of culture over time, its influence is generally long lasting and
slow-moving and difficult to change; such change can only be achieved by
either small and constant adjustments over time (Jones, 2006) or by means
of a very high shock (Guiso et al., 2014).
The geographic dimension is also important. According to the defini-
tion provided by Dasgupta (2003), network externalities may have different
economic effects depending on the network configuration: If they spread
locally, they have an impact on human capital; if rather they give rise to a
global interactions model, they boost externalities under the form of Total
Factor Productivity (TFP). Examples referred to the first case are those
worked out by the recent works by Topa (2001), Munshi (2003) and Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson (2004), which emphasize the importance of social
networks formation in labor markets. Instead, the work by Bala and Goyal
(1998) is an example of social interactions that generate global externalities
that can be associated to technological diffusion (i.e. public goods).
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2.2 Culture and Economic Performance
Why do regions apparently similar in their stage of development differ so
much in their economic systems? What determines economic performance
of countries and regions? Cultural economics support the idea that cul-
tural values inherited from the past affect present decisions and economic
performance.
The hypothesis that culture affects economic growth is supported both
from cross-country and cross-regional evidence (e.g. Banfield, 1958; Putnam
et al., 1993; Granato et al., 1996; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack,
2001; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Tabellini,
2010; Marini, 2013). As far as the regional evidence is concerned, a first con-
nection between culture and economic development was found by Banfield
(1958), who, studying the behavior of citizens of a little town in Lucania in
the post-war era, found in “amoral familism” the cause of socio-economic
backwardness of Southern Italian regions.2 Tabellini (2010), using an in-
strumental variable (IV) approach, shows that culture shapes economics
and institutions when comparing performance of countries and regions who
may share the same stage of development (e.g. European countries) as well
as when investigating regional disparities within these same countries.
The evidence is also rich when we switch to cross-country comparison.
Fukuyama (1995) and La et al. (1997), for instance, point out that the
level of trust present in a society determines the quality of economic or-
ganization, motivating both the presence of large firms in countries where
generalized trust is the rule and the prevalence of small firms, often family-
based, in societies grounded on personalized trust.3 Some work (Granato
2Banfield (1958) refers to “amoral familism” as the widespread attitude in certain
cultures to mistrust most individuals in a community and to trust only small groups of
individuals, such as family members and friends.
3Generalized trust is the term used by the cultural economics literature to describe the
presence of a culture of trust towards the majority of individuals in a society. This has
to be opposed to personalized trust, which, similarly to “amoral familism”, refers to the
tendency to mistrust and behave opportunistically towards the majority of individuals
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et al., 1996; Marini, 2013) show that both culture and economic indicators
explain heterogeneities in growth dynamics, remarking their complemen-
tary importance. More recently, Algan and Cahuc (2010) develop a new
method to assess the causal effect of trust on economic growth. Using both
the General Social Surveys (GSS henceforth) and the World Values Sur-
vey (WVS hereafter) data sets, they derive time-varying values of inherited
trust for a set of international economies and investigate the impact that
variation in inherited trust has on variation in income per capita in the
countries of origin: T heir findings suggest that a large part of income vari-
ation can be explained by variation in inherited trust even after accounting
for country fixed effects and other institutional variables.
2.3 Culture, Institution and Policy
As pointed out by Etounga-Manguelle (Etounga-Manguelle, in Harrison and
Huntington, 2000: 75), when studying the relationship between culture and
institutions “we must be mindful that culture is the mother and institutions
are the children.” Indeed, it is also likely that culture has an impact through
voting on collective choice, policies and what Hall and Jones (1999) define
social infrastructures, that is, “institutions and government policies that
determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate
skills and firms accumulate capital and produce output.”
Some work investigates the relation between culture and institutions
(e.g. Putnam et al., 1993; Tabellini, 2008a), their interaction, and their joint
role in economic development (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Recent stud-
ies have also investigated the impact of culture on policy-making. Aghion
et al. (2011) show that in countries where cooperation in labor relations is
high there is a minor state intervention on minimum wage regulation, while
the opposite is true for countries where distrust in labor relations prevails.
Alesina et al. (2015) develop a model where the choice of labor market insti-
in a society with the exception of the members of a clan or family.
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tutions depends upon cultural values (i.e. family ties) to explain persistent
differences in cross-country labor market regulation. Their model shows
two equilibria: a laissez-faire equilibrium, compatible with the presence of
weak family ties, high mobility of workers and unregulated labor market;
the other, with high demand for labor regulation (e.g. minimum wage and
firing restriction) and strong family ties. They also show that such equi-
libria may persist over time due to the differences in family values across
country and that the drawback of prioritizing the family towards work is a
loss in terms of wages and employment.
2.4 Culture and Finance
Financial contracts are exchanges of money between the borrower and the
financier. In order for the contract to take place, the enforceability of the
contract may not be the only variable to take into account: it is also impor-
tant that the financier and the borrower trust each other, because moral
hazard and adverse selection are often likely to happen when entering a
contractual agreement. Thus, in regions where amoral familism and per-
sonalized trust prevail, there is often a development of alternative ways of
financing, such as those based on loans from parents, relatives and friends
and this gives rise to a scarce development of financial markets. These
results are shown in Guiso et al. (2004), who, analyzing financial devel-
opment in Italian regions and provinces, find that financial markets differ
very much within Italy and such differences are due to variability in levels
of social capital.
The effect of trust is also present in stock market exchanges. Guiso
et al. (2008b) show that individuals that trust less are generally less likely
to invest in the stock market, since the risk of being cheated is not just
a function of the objective features of the stocks, but it also depends on
subjective characteristics of the individual. They also show that this can
provide an explanation to the fact that investments in the stock market is
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of widespread use in some countries, while in others it is not. Moreover,
conditional to the fact that people invest, such investments are likely to be
biased in favor of the firms they know, such as the firm they are employ-
ees for (even though these are not objectively the best investments on the
market) rather than on global knowledge. Thus, the level of trust is an
important determinant also for financial investments of individuals, who,
unless they posses enough information on the available stocks, make their
decisions depend upon trust and on their local knowledge. This evidence
is also consistent with the findings by Dominitz and Manski (2011), who
address the importance of an individual’s subjective expectations on the
stock markets as determinant for investment decisions.
2.5 Culture and Openness
Culture affects commercial agreements across countries and international
joint ventures between firms are also more likely to happen across coun-
tries that share similar cultures. Generally, cultural stereotypes do play an
important role in trade partnerships; bias in trade is also due to common-
ality of religion and of civil law: countries whose main religion is the same
are more likely to trust each other and the same is true for countries with
similar legal systems.
The economic effects of culture in economic exchanges are well docu-
mented in Guiso et al. (2006), who not only consider economic exchanges
but also extend the analysis to foreign direct investments (FDI) and con-
clude that the correlation between trust and economic exchange seems to
be both economically important and pervasive because cultural influences
are also present in FDI decisions across countries.
2.6 Culture and Religion
Religion may influence a society (Harrison and Huntington, 2000; Guiso
et al., 2006). It is well known that protestant societies are based on the
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transmission of values promoting independence, self-realization, self-esteem
and individualism; while instead, in Catholic societies values of charity, at-
tention to poor people and sense of obedience prevail. Furthermore, the
Protestant Church has a decentralized organization, open to local control;
while the Catholic church is based on a hierarchical and centralized organi-
zation.
The role of Protestantism and its connections with economic efficiency
in a society has been largely treated and explained in the pioneer work
by Weber (1930). After Weber (1930) various contributions showed the
importance of Protestantism for economic performance and its components
(e.g. Becker and Woessmann, 2008, 2009).
Moreover, in some countries the prohibition for women to participate
to the labor force for instance reduces the productivity of a whole society.
Recently, Harrison (2011) argues that some religious groups, such as Protes-
tantism, Judaism and Confucianism, manage better the challenges imposed
by modern changes. He argues that certain groups are very good to adapt
their institutions and social policies to changing circumstances and to pro-
mote economic growth, while others, such as for instance Catholicism, Islam
and some African religions, are progress resistant religions. Thus, while the
causal impact of religion on economic growth is still controversial (Barro
and McCleary, 2003; Durlauf et al., 2012) and needs further attention, it is
reasonable to admit that religion impacts economics.
3 The Theoretical Framework
3.1 Contemporaneous Culture and Social Interactions
Social phenomena are an integral part of social networks and they contribute
to their formation (Granovetter, 1985). Social interactions models can be
seen as a variation of game theory formulations, since interactions across
agents of a population can be well represented by evolutionary game theory
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formalizations: the game can be repeated several times and agents are not
required to understand the rules of the game before playing so that they can
adjust their behavior gradually (see Binmore and Dasgupta, 1986; Binmore,
1987, 1988).
Population games models, focusing more on aggregate behavior and
social interactions outcomes rather than on individual-level decision mak-
ing, are a first attempt to represent agents interactions. The extension
of population games to evolutionary dynamics and, for economic models,
the introduction of such games in evolutionary game theory by Foster and
Young (1990) determined the possibility of finding stochastically stable
states to overcome the problems that originally characterized population
games. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics are the less restrictive generaliza-
tion since they allow the revision protocol to vary. A stochastic evolutionary
process may be applied to social dynamics and the formation of social net-
works in a population. Indeed, given a population of individuals, both
social interactions and beliefs updating over time allow the creation and
consolidation of evolving complex social networks and collective beliefs.
Social interactions models (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001a), which allow
individuals to change and update their beliefs according to their experience,
are particularly apt to formalize the formation of contemporaneous culture.
They capture the influence of the reference network on individual behav-
ior; for instance, they can show the extent to which generalized trust of a
reference network influences individual decision to trust others.
3.2 Intergenerational Transmission of Culture
Another way culture may spread is via the intergenerational transmission
of values. Cultural traits can be transmitted across generations by means
of either direct socialization or oblique socialization: the former type of
socialization refers to the direct transmission of culture from parents to
children; the latter type of socialization is transmitted to a child when
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he/she is influenced by a role model in some of his/her traits acquiring
characteristics typical of a society.
The first model of cultural transmission is due to Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981), who use evolutionary biology theory to explain cultural
transmission. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) start from this model and in-
tegrate it with direct socialization extending this socialization mechanism
by allowing imperfect empathy, that is, the fact that parents transmit their
values to their children, who evaluate them according to their own prefer-
ences. Guiso et al. (2008a) develop an overlapping generation model where
children take priors about the trustworthiness of people from their parents
and after gaining some experience they update their priors and transmit
such updated beliefs to their own children. They show that in order to pro-
tect their children parents transmit them too conservative priors that may
lead to self-reinforcing mechanisms and explain the fact that some societies
may be trapped in a low-trust equilibrium. Tabellini (2008b) develops a
model adapted from Dixit (2004) where individuals, after observing their
distance (either social or geographic), play a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma
game in which cooperation is a by-product of values and norms of good
conduct. Bisin and Verdier (2011) partly review these models.
4 Cultural Econometrics
4.1 Econometrics of Contemporaneous Culture: So-
cial Interactions
Social interactions models and models of cultural transmission have precise
implications for econometric specification. Indeed, these models differ from
other economic models in that they formalize concepts like herding behav-
ior, neighborhood effects, interpersonal interactions and social networks,
which are endogenously determined.
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If we define an individual choice characterized by:
ωi = k + cXi + dYg(i) + Jgm
e
ig + εi (1)
where k is a constant specifying costs and benefits of making the choice, Xi
are individual characteristics, Yg(i) are average characteristics of the society
that may refer to either average characteristics of the region the individual
lives in (e.g. GDP) or to the average characteristics of individuals (e.g. av-
erage wage, average education), the so called role models, meg are beliefs of
each individual on the average choice of individuals of a same population,
J is the parameter that measures the strength of social interactions and εi
is the error term. The social interactions literature generally assumes ratio-
nality of individuals, who are assumed to be able to predict the objective
value of the social interactions term (meg = mg), to close the model.
The first concern to think about when dealing with social interactions
models is identification: this problem is due to what Manski called the re-
flection problem (Manski, 1993), which comes from the necessity to distin-
guish between the direct effect of contextual effects and the effect generated
by the social interactions term. While in linear-in-mean models the struc-
tural parameters cannot be identified, in the nonlinear case the collinearity
problem does not arise due to the nonlinearity of the estimator: in these
models a change in individual characteristics never changes proportionally
with the change incurred in the characteristics of the group. This is one
of the main advantages of using nonlinear probability models for the anal-
ysis of social interactions and the formation and transmission of collective
beliefs. For a complete and detailed evidence on identification in discrete
choice models, the reader should refer to the existing literature (Brock and
Durlauf, 2001a,c; Durlauf, 2004; Blume et al., 2011).
The second concern emerging in the study of social interactions is a con-
sequence of the fact that some explanatory variables in social interactions
models result from the creation of social networks and for this reason are
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affected by selection problems, which cause problems of nonhortogonality
between the error term and the regressors. Various methods have been
proposed in the literature to solve the selection problem. Some involve the
use of nonparametric or semiparametric techniques or a selection correction
a` la Heckman (Heckman, 1979; Newey et al., 1990; Ioannides and Zabel,
2008). Finally, in particular when the researcher is modeling a nonrandom
assignment model, that is, a model where individuals self-select in a group,
the use of sequential nonlinear models (e.g. sequential logit models, as in
Marini, 2016) is appropriate to solve the selection model: These models may
also control for unobserved heterogeneity (see e.g. Cameron and Heckman,
1998; Train, 2003; Buis, 2011, for details).
However, despite the presence of econometric problems these models
present very interesting properties too. Indeed, a sizeable J, the parameter
that measures the strength of social interactions, is a necessary condition
for the presence of self-reinforcing equilibria (Brock and Durlauf, 2001c,
2007; Zanella, 2007). The rationale behind these mechanisms is as follows.
The outcomes of a choice (e.g. high -H- and low -L- types) depend on both
private utility and social utility. As a matter of fact, individual beliefs may
be formalized as follows:
ωi = hi + Jgm
e
g + εi (2)
where hi, which equals k+ cXi + dYg, is the private deterministic utility, εi
is the stochastic component of private utility and Jmeg represents the social
utility.
According to this equation, if J is above a certain threshold, J > J¯ we
only know that multiple equilibria arise (see Brock and Durlauf, 2001c),
however it is with the interplay between social utility and both determin-
istic and random private utility that we know which equilibrium could be
reached. Assuming that individuals adapt to the average behavior of other
individuals in a society (because adapting is less costly than deviating), it is
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likely that individuals in regions with low (high) level of trustworthiness will
choose to join a low (high) level equilibrium rather than choosing a high
(low) equilibrium. These outcomes are self-reinforcing and may generate
social traps, which are the social equivalent of poverty traps in economics.
Thus, resilience and phase transitions are relevant for social interactions.
Resilience refers to the fact that once the transition of a highly connected
network is established, it creates a very strong state of affairs that is capable
to resist even in presence of deterioration. Phase transition indicates that
small changes in private utility can be related to large equilibrium changes
in average behavior. Intuitively, a model exhibits phase transitions if a very
small change in a parameter can imply a very large change of the proper-
ties of the model. To clarify, we can think at the change in equilibrium
values of trustworthiness if suddenly all the individuals living in a society
where amoral familism prevails decide that they have higher private gains if
they become trustworthy people: the changes in equilibrium outcomes are
supposed to be much higher than the small change put in practice by all
virtuous people. This characteristic makes these models close to physical
models reproducing the change of state of a substance.
These two properties indicate that values and beliefs may persist over
time if they are well rooted in a society, unless a (positive) shock (that may
be either induced by policy makers or the result of endogenous changes)
implies a change for the whole population.
Finally, social interactions models are observational learning models
(Manski, 2000): expectations generated by these models have policy im-
plications different from preference interactions, because while preferences
are not influenced by updated information, observational learning models
are influenced by policies that are aimed at changing information and col-
lective beliefs. A person may not trust others because he/she thinks that
everybody in a society conform to personalized trust and amoral familism.
Thus, a policy aimed at increasing (expectations about) the level of trust-
worthiness in a group may have a high impact on their behavior; instead, if
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a person decides not to trust anyone because he/she prefers to conform to
norms of amoral familism, then policies will not be able to influence his/her
behavior.4 Also, given the interplay between J and h, policy makers may
lead a group out of a social trap by, for instance, improving (average) in-
dividual characteristics (e.g. education, income etc.) of the group that
could directly contribute to increase expectations about the social interac-
tions term (the reader may think that, for instance, individuals with higher
levels of education have more access to information and are more likely to
trust others and at aggregate level this would raise expectations about the
average level of trustworthiness of the reference group).
Thus, according to the theory explained so far, persistence and hysteresis
are generated from self-reinforcing mechanisms and together with bounded
rationality (that is, taking into account that individuals take decisions using
limited information) may explain the presence of multiple equilibria and
social traps.
Finally, given the spatial spread of social interactions and their likeli-
hood to generate externalities, the utilization of spatial models of social
interactions allowing for dependence (either geographical or social) has to
be promoted.
4.2 Econometrics of Cultural Transmission
A practice commonly used by researchers to measure cultural traits is to
aggregate at regional or country level the answers provided by survey ques-
tionnaires using either mean values or percentages of people who gave a
positive answer to the questions. Recently, researchers have been using
either principal component analysis or factor analysis to build cultural in-
dicators (e.g. Tabellini, 2010).
With regards to econometric problems, the most important is reverse
4Social interactions models assume self-consistency, that is, individual expectations
and the objective probability generated by the model are equal (me = m), so policy
makers may equivalently increase the objective level of trustworthiness in a group.
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causality; indeed, culture is a slow moving variable that changes in the
long run, and it is likely to co-evolve with economic performance and other
dependent variables that vary in the medium or long term. In order to
overcome the problem researchers may either lag cultural values one period
with respect to the dependent variable (Marini, 2013) or use instrumental
variables (IV) estimators (e.g. Tabellini, 2010) to control for endogeneity of
cultural indicators. However, sometimes the appropriateness of instrumen-
tal variables may be a problem due to the difficulty to find good instruments
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001b; Durlauf et al., 2005). Besides, the utilization
of fixed effects estimators may not be appropriate when dealing with cul-
tural indicators, because fixed effects estimators are not suitable (Durlauf
et al., 2005; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010) when variables show persistence
over time since they would not be very informative.
Also, culture is often used to explain persistent variables that are likely
to follow an AR(1) process (e.g. economic growth). From an econometric
perspective, this requires the use of dynamic panel data to be estimated
by means of GMM approaches (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, such tools require a
few number of time observations, which is difficult to obtain from surveys.
Indeed, we need at least three or four time periods for the analysis, given
that instruments should be lagged at least two periods with respect to the
dependent variable, four when we use differences. This is a problem because
international data sets (e.g. the WVS) used to build cultural indicators may
not have sufficient time series observations. Thus, in many cases this makes
impossible the estimation via either Difference-GMM or System-GMM. This
problem may be overcome for data coming from surveys with longer time
series (e.g. General Social Survey). The validity of instruments is a further
problem to take into account also in dynamic panels.
Only very recently the use of spatial econometric methods has been ap-
plied to growth models in order to take into account the presence of both
spatial dependence and externalities (Anselin, 1988, 2003; Ertur and Koch,
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2007; Le and Fischer, 2008; Le and Pace, 2009). The idea that the network
dimension is important to explain the spread of social capital has been ex-
plicitly and implicitly remarked by the literature. As suggested in Dasgupta
(2003), the impact of social capital varies depending on the nature of social
networks. Durlauf (2004) points out that social and geographical proximity
matter to explain similarity in policies. Tabellini (2008b) argues that both
time and spatial dimension of cultural values is crucial to determine eco-
nomic efficiency. Since culture is likely to generate externalities, as pointed
out in Marini (2011) linking the spatial econometric literature to cultural
economics is desirable and should be considered one of the new frontiers of
the empirics of cultural economics.
Finally, the use of structural models should be incentivized in future
research to analyse the co-evolution of culture and economics: the iden-
tification of all the structural parameters of the model may render policy
evaluation and design more effective. Bayesian estimation (e.g. Koop, 2003)
can also make the model more informative by accommodating the presence
of cultural priors and, given the data, may help to validate the theoretical
models.
Before concluding this section, it is important to remark that sometimes
vignettes (King and Wand, 2007) can be used to compare answers to survey
cultural questions and beliefs across countries.
5 Conclusions
The paper surveyed the literature on cultural economics.
In the first part of the analysis we reviewed situations where culture
matters for economics and we remarked the relevance of both spatial and
time dimensions for the spread of culture.
In the second part of the paper we went through both theory and econo-
metrics of cultural economics distinguishing between contemporaneous and
intergenerational cultural transmission.
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Along the survey we provided suggestions for future research. Given
that culture is likely to generate externalities, the use of spatial econometric
methods should be incentivized to allow for spatial dependence and the
presence of externalities generated by culture. Also, Bayesian inference
could accommodate the presence of cultural priors in a model and help to
validate theoretical models. Finally, the use of structural models could lead
to effective policy evaluation and decisions by performing counterfactual
scenarios or policies.
Synchronizing individual and macroeconomic policies is ideal to let re-
gions escape from poverty traps and to boost economic development (Durlauf,
2012). This may be achieved using ad hoc instruments specific to the coun-
try or regions that could help maintaining cultural heterogeneities and at
the same time leading the economy out of poverty and social traps.
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